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Whereas there is extensive documentation that attribute framing inﬂuences the content of peoples thought, we generally know
less about how it aﬀects the processes assumed to precede those thoughts. While existing explanations for attribute framing eﬀects
rely completely on valence-based associative processing, the results obtained in the present study are also consistent with the notion
that negative framing stimulates more eﬀortful and thorough information processing than positive framing. Speciﬁcally, results from
a simulated business decision-making experiment showed that decision makers receiving negatively framed information had signif-
icantly better recall than those receiving positively framed information. Furthermore, decision makers in the negative framing con-
dition were less conﬁdent than decision makers in the positively framed condition. Finally, compared to a no-framing condition,
decision makers receiving positive framing deviated signiﬁcantly more in evaluation than decision makers receiving negative framing
did.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Attribute framing; Cognitive processing; Susceptibility to framingThere is extensive documentation that the formula-
tion of a decision stimulus or an event inﬂuences how
decision makers think and decide. According to Tversky
and Kahneman (1981), a decision frame may be deﬁned
as referring to the decision makers conception of acts,
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particu-
lar choice. Hereby, the frame that a decision maker
adopts depends heavily on how a decision problem is de-
scribed, although norms, habits, and personal character-
istics also play a part (Kahneman & Miller, 1986;
Ku¨hberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).
Since Kahneman and Tverskys (1979) seminal work, a
large number of studies have demonstrated that framing
normatively equivalent information in positive versus
negative ways, so called valence-based framing, may sys-
tematically aﬀect the decisions or actions decision mak-0749-5978/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.08.001
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nhh.no (M. Selart).ers take. Even though framing eﬀects have been
documented across several decision making situations
(see Ku¨hberger (1998) and Levin et al. (1998) for reviews
of the framing literature), the search for a deeper under-
standing of the cognitive processes that underlie valence
framing has been limited (Levin et al., 1998). Indeed,
Ku¨hberger (1998) refers to the cognitive processes that
are responsible for framing eﬀects as a ‘‘stepchild’’ of
framing research.
In an attempt to better explain how positively and
negatively valenced information aﬀect judgments and
decisions, Levin et al. (1998) developed a typology to
distinguish between three distinct types of valence fram-
ing eﬀects with diﬀerent underlying mechanisms and
consequences. Risky choice framing eﬀects occur when
willingness to take a risk depends on whether the poten-
tial outcomes are framed positively or negatively. Goal
framing eﬀects occur when a persuasive message has dif-
ferent appeal depending on whether it stresses the posi-
tive consequences of performing an act to achieve a
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forming the act. Finally, attribute framing eﬀects occur
when evaluations of an object or event are more favor-
able if a key attribute within any given context is framed
in positive rather than negative terms.
Due to its simplicity (i.e., positive framing supports
more favorable evaluations and negative framing sup-
ports less favorable evaluations), attribute framing is
particularly suitable for providing insights into the nat-
ure of the information processing diﬀerences resulting
from positive and negative framing (Levin et al.,
1998). Levin and Gaeth (1988), Levin, Johnson, Russo,
and Deldin (1985), and Levin et al. (1998) argue that
attribute framing eﬀects occur because information is
encoded relative to its descriptive valence. Positive label-
ing of an attribute will thus lead to an encoding of the
information that tends to evoke favorable associations
in memory, whereas negative labeling of the same attri-
bute will cause an encoding that evokes unfavorable
associations. According to such an associative model
explanation, material that is associatively linked to the
framing manipulation is more likely to be used in vari-
ous constructive cognitive tasks, leading to framing con-
gruency in attention, learning, memory, associations,
and eventually to positivity and negativity biases in eval-
uations and judgments.
The associative model may be valid in explaining why
attribute framing aﬀects the nature of evaluations or the
content of cognition (i.e., what people think). It may be
less useful, however, in explaining more subtle eﬀects
attribute framing may have on the process of cognition
(i.e., how people think). First, the associative model does
not take into account the possibility that negative fram-
ing may stimulate more eﬀortful and thorough cognitive
processing than positive framing. Although only indi-
rectly evidenced in the context of attribute framing
(Dunegan, 1993), it is frequently observed that people
encode and respond to positively and negatively va-
lenced aﬀective and informational stimuli in systemati-
cally diﬀerent ways (e.g., Bless, 2002; Chatterjee,
Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; Dunegan, 1994; For-
gas, 2002a; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Taylor, 1991).
Second, if the valence of attribute framing has system-
atic processing consequences, decision makers in posi-
tive and negative framing conditions may also diﬀer in
how aﬀected they are by the framing information. Then,
however, the explanation of results showing that posi-
tively valenced framing creates a positivity bias and neg-
atively valenced framing a negativity bias solely by way
of valence-based associative processes, may represent an
oversimpliﬁed picture of how attribute framing aﬀects
cognitive processing.
This being the case, the current study was undertaken
to explore potential asymmetrical inﬂuences of posi-
tively versus negatively valenced framing on modes of
cognitive processing and susceptibility to attribute fram-ing eﬀects in evaluations. Improving our understanding
of the processes that underlie attribute framing will not
only provide more satisfactory accounts of attribute
framing eﬀects, but may also have implications for man-
agerial decision-making and the emerging research on
how to attenuate or eliminate framing biases among ‘‘re-
al world’’ decision makers (e.g., Hodgkinson, Bown,
Maule, Glaister, & Pearman, 1999; Wright & Goodwin,
2002). In order to detect a potential asymmetry in sus-
ceptibility to framing we compare whether positive
and negative framing decision-makers deviate more or
less in framing eﬀects compared to decision makers
receiving no framing information. To explore whether
framing may act as a catalyst for diﬀerent modes of cog-
nitive processing we include three diﬀerent conceptual-
izations of cognitive processing; self-reported
analytical thinking reﬂecting the level of analytic versus
intuitive processing (Mantel & Kardes, 1999), and deci-
sion makers amount of recall of decision event informa-
tion and their level of conﬁdence in estimating the
accuracy of their own recall (Kuvaas & Kaufmann,
2004). Dunegan (1993) pointed to memory as an impor-
tant distinguishing characteristic of diﬀerent cognitive
processing modes. After decision makers have made a
decision, they tend to recall much more information
about the decision event when controlled or more eﬀort-
ful processing is used (Kernan & Lord, 1989; Langer,
1989a; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Regarding level
of conﬁdence, dozens of laboratory studies have docu-
mented the prevalence of too much conﬁdence in judg-
ment, i.e., decision makers certainty that their
predictions are correct most often exceeds the accuracy
of those predictions (Simon & Houghton, 2003). The
tendency to be highly conﬁdent is found to be greater
when decision makers act as ‘‘cognitive misers’’ (Maha-
jan, 1992). High levels of conﬁdence is thus more likely
to occur when decision makers engage in less eﬀortful
processing, as indicated by limited information search
(Cooper, Folta, & Woo, 1995; Harvey, 1994), truncated
mental search where potentially critical information is
ignored (Mahajan, 1992) or used incorrectly (Au, Chan,
Wang, & Vertinsky, 2003).Theory and hypotheses
Most contemporary models of individual informa-
tion processing view discrepancy between a desired or
expected state and an experienced state as an activator
of more rigorous and systematic information processing
(e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1990; Lord & Maher, 1990;
Louis & Sutton, 1991). In accordance with evolutionary
and adaptive arguments (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski,
1990; Taylor, 1991), it is argued that because negative
or unfavorable incoming information may signal incon-
sistency between expected or experienced conditions, or
1 A measure of the tendency to engage in eﬀortful, analytical
thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
2 Equal to or greater than 1.0 in magnitude on a 7-point scale.
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decision makers to engage in more deliberate and careful
analysis (e.g., Dunegan, 1994; Woﬀord & Goodwin,
1990). Conversely, when information is positive, cogni-
tive processing tends to be less thorough and systematic
(e.g., Dunegan, 1994; Klein, 1989). Consistent with the
conventional wisdom that ‘‘if it aint broke dont ﬁx
it’’, decision makers may feel justiﬁed in using a more
cognitively economic response (Dunegan, 1994).
Most aﬀect-cognition models make a similar proposi-
tion (e.g., Bless, 2002; Forgas, 2002a, 2002b). According
to the feelings as information model, for instance, nega-
tive aﬀect informs the individual that current conditions
are problematic and await solution (Clore, Schwarz, &
Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 1990). To solve problems,
information processing is characterized by adherence
to established rules and procedures as well as attention
to detail and systematic information processing. Positive
aﬀect, in contrast, informs the individual that current
conditions are benign and signals that systematic infor-
mation processing is unnecessary because no problem
awaits solution. Accordingly, in studies where partici-
pants are induced to feel positive or negative aﬀect
and then are given a task in which their type of process-
ing can be inferred, those in negative emotional states or
moods are usually found to engage in more bottom-up
and systematic processing, whereas those in positive
emotional states or moods are found to engage in more
top-down and more heuristic processing (e.g., Forgas,
2002a; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Although there are dif-
ferent explanations for this eﬀect (Bless, 2002), most af-
fect-cognition models stipulate that the information
processing consequences arise from the valence of the
aﬀective state (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). It should be
noted, however, that the ﬁnding of positive–negative
information processing asymmetry is qualiﬁed by excep-
tions (e.g., Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Isen, 1993;
Staw & Barsade, 1993), contextual contingencies (e.g.,
Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 2004; Martin, 2001; Martin &
Stoner, 1996), and evidence that other aﬀective dimen-
sions than valence can inﬂuence processing (e.g., Tie-
dens & Linton, 2001).
While activating more systematic or eﬀortful cogni-
tive processing when experiencing an unfavorable or un-
happy rather than a favorable or happy situation may
seem quite logical and functional, the question ad-
dressed here is whether a similar response will emerge
when equivalent information is merely framed in a posi-
tive or negative way. Whereas Levin et al. (1998) did not
acknowledge positive–negative information processing
asymmetry as a potential theoretical account for attri-
bute framing eﬀects, they relied on this mechanisms to
explain goal framing eﬀects, and Ku¨hberger (1997) dis-
cussed this possibility in a risky choice framing context.
Furthermore, based on several experiments where par-
ticipants in the negative risky choice frame were con-ﬂicted about which option to choose, rather than risk
seeking, Schneider (1992) suggested an aspiration level
contingency where negative framing leads to higher
aspiration levels and higher awareness than positive
framing, consistent with a negative framing-systematic
processing view. In the context of attribute framing,
Dunegan (1993) reported two studies that indirectly sup-
port the view that attribute framing systematically inﬂu-
ences modes of cognitive processing. Speciﬁcally, he
found signiﬁcant relationships between how subjects
interpreted a situation and how they responded only in
the negative-frame condition and that current and tra-
jectory images were perceived to be less compatible
when feedback information was framed negatively.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Decision makers receiving negatively
framed information will report a higher degree of
analytical thinking, recall more information, and be less
conﬁdent than decision makers receiving positively
framed information.
So far, we have argued that there may be systematic
processing consequences associated with the valence of
attribute framing. In this section, we discuss contrasting
views on how potential processing diﬀerences may aﬀect
susceptibility to attribute framing eﬀects in evaluation.
The conventional explanation for cognitive biases is that
people in general tend to rely on heuristic information
processing or judgmental short cuts to form inferences
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Accordingly, if negative
framing decision makers engage in more systematic
and relatively less heuristic processing than positive
framing decision makers, they should also deviate less
from rational norms of decision making and be less sus-
ceptible to attribute framing eﬀects. Indirect support for
this prediction is provided by research evidence showing
that induced elaborated thinking eliminates or reduces
risky choice framing eﬀects, such as when decision mak-
ers are asked to provide justiﬁcation for their choice or
spend more time on a decision making task (e.g., Sieck
& Yates, 1997; Takemura, 1982, 1994). Another piece
of indirect evidence stems from studies revealing that
subjects with higher need-for-cognition scores1 are less
susceptible to risky choice framing eﬀects (Chatterjee
et al., 2000; Smith & Levin, 1996). Similarly, Stanovich
and West (1998) found that students with higher aca-
demic aptitude, as measured by SAT scores, were not
as aﬀected by risky choice framing as students with low-
er academic aptitude. Furthermore, although Levin,
Gaeth, Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002) found no eﬀect
of need-for-cognition on attribute framing, they found
that of those subjects showing large diﬀerence scores2
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the positive direction while only 3 were in the negative
direction.
In aﬀect-cognition research, the kind of vigilant, sys-
tematic attention to stimulus details caused by negative
aﬀect has been used to explain enhanced stereotype and
priming eﬀects under positive mood and greater sensitiv-
ity of negative mood subjects to strong and weak argu-
ments in persuasion (Fiedler, 2000). Moreover, Forgas
(1998) has found processing consequences of negative
mood to reduce and even eliminate such common judg-
mental biases as the fundamental attribution error. He
has also reported evidence that positive aﬀect tends to
increase, and negative eﬀect to reduce, the likelihood
of other kinds of cognitive mistakes in social thinking
(Forgas, 2000). Even though there is much evidence that
positive aﬀect may also produce distinct processing
advantages (e.g., increased ﬂexibility and more creative
thinking3), the ﬁndings reported above suggest that po-
sitive attribute framing should create greater framing ef-
fects than negative attribute framing:
Hypothesis 2. Compared to decision makers receiving
no framing information, decision makers receiving
positively framed information will be more inﬂuenced
by framing information in evaluation than will decision
makers receiving negatively framed information.
The position that cognitive eﬀort should reduce the
eﬀects of framing has received modest empirical support
(LeBoeuf & Shaﬁr, 2003) and is challenged by the sug-
gestion that eﬀortful processing may sometimes increase
framing eﬀects. First, studies indicating that need-for-
cognition and SAT scores reduce framing eﬀects have
used risky-choice framing tasks. In such tasks (e.g.,
the ‘‘Asian Disease Problem’’), where the ability to
understand and use rule-based decision aids in a consis-
tent manner would be appropriate, decision makers
engaging in systematic processing may have an advan-
tage. This may not necessarily be the case for attribute
framing, however. Second, Crawford and Skowronski
(1998) found that participants with higher need-for-cog-
nition scores exhibited greater sensitivity to biasing ef-
fects than participants with lower need-for-cognition
scores when the decision task involved recalling stereo-
type-consistent information, and research on persuasion
suggests that high need-for-cognition subjects may
sometimes be more aﬀected by framing than their low
need-for-cognition counterparts (Wegener, Petty, &
Klein, 1994). Consistent with the associative model
explanation of attribute framing, as suggested by Craw-
ford and Skowronski (1998); Levin et al. (1998) argue
that higher need-for-cognition individuals are more3 See for instance the special issue of Psychological Inquiry on the
role of aﬀect in social thinking and behavior (2002, Vol. 13, No. 1).likely to invest the cognitive eﬀort required to search
for, ﬁnd, and remember subtle themes that run through
the information to which they are exposed. Similarly,
Rothman and Salovey (1997) argue that cognitive pro-
cessing mediate the inﬂuence of framing and remind
us that in order for framing to have an eﬀect, a mini-
mum level of attention or systematic processing is re-
quired. Thus, one may also argue that more eﬀortful
or systematic processing will result in higher selective
attention to framing-congruent information and to the
forming of more framing-congruent associations than
less eﬀortful or systematic processing. For instance, in
explaining stronger impact of negative than of positive
goal (message) framing, Levin et al. (1998) refer to the
negativity bias that people pay greater attention to
and are inﬂuenced more by negative than by compara-
ble positive information. Aﬀect-cognition research
points to a similar eﬀect, arguing that aﬀect infusion
is greater when people engage in more extensive and
elaborate thinking (e.g., Forgas, 2001). Furthermore,
research reviewed by Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, and
Jarvis (1996) supports the view that individuals high
in need-for-cognition are more susceptible to the inﬂu-
ence of aﬀective states on cognition than are individuals
low in need-for-cognition. Thus, if negative framing
facilitates more eﬀortful or systematic processing than
positive framing, we may expect that negative attribute
framing will create greater framing eﬀects than positive
attribute framing:
Hypothesis 2 0. Compared to decision makers receiving
no framing information, decision makers receiving
negatively framed information will be more inﬂuenced
by framing information in evaluation than will decision
makers receiving positively framed information.Methodology
Subjects and procedure
Seventy-three undergraduate students participated in
the study. They were all enrolled in an organization the-
ory course at a business school in Norway. As part of a
voluntary classroom exercise, participants were asked to
take part in a decision-making study where they should
act as project managers of a student organization in a
simulated business situation. The task was to decide
on how much the student organization should invest
in a particular project. Participants were given a booklet
of materials that included a business scenario, a manip-
ulation check measure, an instruction to make an invest-
ment decision, and a measure of self-reported analytical
thinking. At the end of the task, the responses were col-
lected and a second instrument designed to measure re-
call and level of conﬁdence was presented to the
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briefed about the study.
Variables
Framing
The brief business scenario (slightly less than one
page) in which an investment decision had to be made
about funding allocations for a project team was used
to manipulate framing (see the Appendix). All partici-
pants received the same scenario, with one slight modi-
ﬁcation: the positive framing group (n = 25) read, ‘‘of
the projects undertaken by this team, seven of the last
10 have been successful.’’ The corresponding scenario
provided to the negative framing group (n = 23)4 read,
‘‘of the projects undertaken by this team, three of the
last 10 have been unsuccessful,’’ while the no-framing
group (n = 25) was not informed about prior perfor-
mance. With the exception of this sentence, all informa-
tion was the same. The framing eﬀect was measured by a
three-item 9-point semantic-diﬀerential scale (Mittal &
Ross, 1998) reﬂecting the degree of negative–positive
evaluation of the scenario (a threat/opportunity for the
organization, a potential for losing/making money,
and a positive–negative situation). The Cronbachs al-
pha for the scale was .82 and a composite score was cre-
ated for each subject by averaging the items.
Self-reported analytical thinking
Self-reported analytical thinking was assessed using
six previously used items (Mantel & Kardes, 1999) that
were modiﬁed to ﬁt the current research problem. The
items were presented to the participants immediately
after they had made the investment decision. Examples
of items are: ‘‘The answer just came to me’’ (reverse
coded); ‘‘My decision was based on facts rather than
on general impressions and feelings’’; ‘‘My decision
was based on careful thinking and reasoning.’’ Agree-
ment was expressed on a 1 = ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to
7 = ‘‘strongly agree’’ scale. Cronbachs alpha for the
scale was .78 and a composite score was created for each
subject by averaging the items.
Recall
The business scenario used to manipulate framing
contained several pieces of factual information such as
names and numbers that were used to deﬁne 10 recall-
able questions (a sample questions is ‘‘how many stu-
dents are members of the student organization’’). Each
question was scored from 0 to 10 dependent on the cor-
rectness of the answer. With the aim of presenting par-
ticipants with items varying in degree of diﬃculty, we
developed two questions that requested more than one4 Two responses suﬀered from missing data.answer (‘‘what are the names of the student organiza-
tions three main sponsors’’ and ‘‘in addition to yourself
being the project leader, what are the titles of the two
other members of the management team’’). These were
scored 5 if one out of two answers were correct, and
3.33 if one out of three were correct. An observed recall
score was created for each subject by averaging over the
10 questions. Since recall was assumed to be a formative
as opposed to reﬂective measure (i.e., the items/observed
variables are assumed to cause the latent variable/con-
struct, rather than that the items/observed variables
are caused by the latent variable/construct (e.g., Bollen
& Lennox, 1991)). Under these conditions, internal con-
sistency between items was of minimal importance be-
cause items that might even be negatively related can
serve as meaningful indicators of a construct (Nunnally
& Bernstein, 1994). Accordingly, we did not compute
Cronbachs alpha for the index.
Level of conﬁdence
Level of conﬁdence was measured by ﬁrst asking
respondents to estimate the level of certainty for correct
answers on the recall-questions. Immediately after each
of the 10 recall question they were asked to indicate, on
a 0–100%-scale, how sure they were that each of their
answers were correct. We then divided these responses
by ten, and used the diﬀerence between certainty ratings
and accuracy or actual recall to calculate 10 conﬁdence
scores ranging from 10 to 10, where a positive score
implied overconﬁdence, a negative score implied under-
conﬁdence, and a score of 0 implied a perfectly cali-
brated response. For instance, if the certainty score for
a correct answer (scored 10) were 100%, the conﬁdence
score of this item would be perfectly calibrated (10–
10 = 0). If the certainty score for a correct answer were
90%, the conﬁdence score would constitute an under-
conﬁdent item response (9–10 = 1). Conversely, if the
certainty score for a wrong answer (scored 0) were
90%, this would constitute a highly overconﬁdent item
response (9–0 = 9). For the recall items that were asking
for two titles and three names (of main sponsors),
respondents were asked to provide conﬁdence estimates
that both titles and all three names were correct.
Respondents were instructed not to provide certainty
estimates of unanswered recall items (resulting in a per-
fectly calibrated conﬁdence score of 0, that is, neither
overconﬁdent nor underconﬁdent). A composite index
was created for each subject by averaging the 10 conﬁ-
dence scores. Being based on the recall questions, conﬁ-
dence was also seen as a formative index and no
Cronbachs alpha was computed.
Manipulation check
The three-item 9-point semantic-diﬀerential scale
measuring the degree of negative–positive evaluation
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tion. Scores were from 1 to 9, where a higher score im-
plies a more positive evaluation. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with framing manipulation (nega-
tive, no-framing, or positive) as factor showed that the
group means for framing eﬀects were diﬀerent
(F2,70 = 68.68 p < .001), and Tukeys honestly signiﬁcant
diﬀerence test revealed that all three means were signif-
icantly diﬀerent from each other (Mnegative = 4.42,
SD = 1.22; Mno-framing = 5.48, SD = 1.06; Mpositive =
7.76, SD = .70).
Analysis and results
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA)
was used prior to testing of Hypothesis 1 because recall
and conﬁdence were signiﬁcantly correlated (r = .60,
p < 0.001). MANCOVA can test whether there is a sig-
niﬁcant multivariate eﬀect of the independent variable
on the dependent variables after controlling the correla-
tion between the latter. Using Wilkss lambda (k), this
analysis revealed that framing (k = .70, F3,43 = 6.22,
p < .01) was signiﬁcantly related to the set of dependent
variables. These results suggest that separate hypotheses
testing for each dependent variable could be performed
without a high risk for an inﬂated Type I error.
The impact of framing on each of the dependent vari-
ables was tested using between-subjects analyses. These
analyses revealed that the two groups did not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly from each other in self-reported analytical
thinking (F1,45 = .35, n.s.; Mnegative = 4.10, SD = .94;
Mpositive = 3.93, SD = 1.01), but that the negative fram-
ing group had signiﬁcantly better recall (F1,45 = 14.56,
p < .001; Mnegative = 7.93, SD = 1.15; Mpositive = 6.43,
SD = 1.53) and lower conﬁdence (F1,45 = 9.93, p <
.001; Mnegative = .37, SD = .96; Mpositive = .66, SD =
1.26) than the positive framing group.5 Accordingly,
the hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that decision makers
receiving negatively framed information will report a
higher degree of analytical thinking, recall more infor-
mation, and be less conﬁdent than decision makers
receiving positively framed information was supported
for recall and conﬁdence (the positive framing subjects
were slightly overconﬁdent and the negative framing
subjects slightly underconﬁdent), but not for self-re-
ported analytical thinking.
To test the competing hypotheses on susceptibility to
framing we ﬁrst calculated the diﬀerences between the
mean value framing eﬀect of the no-framing group and5 Scales: analytical thinking scores were from a 1 to 7 Likert scale,
where a higher score implies a higher level of analytical thinking; recall
scores were from 0 to 10, where a higher score implies better recall;
conﬁdence scores were from 10 to 10, where a positive score implies
overconﬁdence, a negative score implies underconﬁdence, and a score
of 0 implies a perfectly calibrated response.the framing eﬀects scores given by the negative and
positive framing subjects. ANOVA revealed that the
positive framing subjects deviated signiﬁcantly more
from the mean of the no-framing group than the
negative framing subjects (F1,45 = 18.30, p < .001;
Mnegative = 1.06, SD = 1.22; Mpositive = 2.28, SD = .70).
A disadvantage with this method is that it does not take
into account the standard deviation of the no-framing
condition. We hence computed the standardized diﬀer-
ences (Cohens d) for the no-framing group and each
experimental group (Cohen, 1988). In these computa-
tions, pooled standard deviations were applied in each
case (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). The standardized dif-
ference between the no-framing group and the positive
framing group (d c-pf = 2.53, with 100% non-overlap in
conﬁdence intervals) and the standardized diﬀerence be-
tween the no-framing group and the negative framing
group (d c-nf = .93, with 52% non-overlap in conﬁdence
intervals) did, however, not indicate that the standard
deviation of the no-framing group in any way would dis-
conﬁrm the results obtained from the ANOVA. Thus,
the hypothesis stating that when compared to decision
makers receiving no framing information, decision mak-
ers receiving positively framed information will be more
inﬂuenced by framing information in evaluation than
will decision makers receiving negatively framed infor-
mation (Hypothesis 2), was supported, while the com-
peting hypothesis (Hypothesis 2 0) was not.Discussion
Consistent with prior theorizing (Levin et al., 1998),
valence-based associative processing is probably a valid
explanation of how attribute framing aﬀects the content
of peoples thought, and thus why positive attribute
framing led to more positive evaluations of the business
scenario than negative attribute framing in our study.
The obtained diﬀerences in recall, conﬁdence, and sus-
ceptibility to framing eﬀects, however, suggest that
asymmetrical information processing may also play a
role in explaining attribute framing eﬀects. Accordingly,
this study contributes to the framing literature by
extending previous accounts for attribute framing ef-
fects. It should be noted, however, that there is some dis-
agreement on how to characterize negative–positive
information processing asymmetry. In the framing liter-
ature, Schneider (1992), for instance, refers to aspiration
levels that are more diﬃcult to achieve and higher
awareness in the face of negative framing, while Levin
et al. (1998) refer to the negativity bias and that the im-
pact of negative information is systematically stronger
than the impact of objectively equivalent positive
information in goal framing. Furthermore, while prior
aﬀect-cognition research suggested that people experi-
encing positive aﬀect tend to employ more superﬁcial
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argues that the processing consequences are better
understood in terms of use of general knowledge struc-
tures and attention to the details of a situation (e.g.,
Bless, 2002; Fiedler & Bless, 2000; Forgas, 2002a, 2002b).
Prior attribute framing research has usually investi-
gated evaluation eﬀects of labeling a key attribute in po-
sitive versus negative terms without questioning
diﬀerences in susceptibility to framing eﬀects. By includ-
ing a no-framing condition, we were able to examine the
magnitude of framing eﬀects and found that participants
receiving positive framing were more aﬀected by attri-
bute framing than those receiving negative framing.
Also this ﬁnding is consistent with asymmetrical infor-
mation processing eﬀects of negative versus positive
framing and the position that more eﬀortful and less
heuristic processing may reduce susceptibility to cogni-
tive biases (e.g., Sieck & Yates, 1997; Takemura, 1994;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This is not to say, how-
ever, that eﬀortful processing should always reduce
framing eﬀects. The business scenario used in our study
contained more information and was considerably more
complex and ambiguous than is usually the case in attri-
bute framing research. In such a research context, deci-
sion makers using relatively more eﬀortful processing
may have been better able to counterbalance the fram-
ing information with other and more relevant informa-
tion, than those using comparably less eﬀortful
processing. Thus, for some tasks, probably most com-
plex or analytical challenging tasks, a facilitating eﬀect
of more detailed processing should be more likely than
an inhibiting or biasing eﬀect (e.g., Au et al., 2003;
Cacioppo et al., 1996; Huber & Seiser, 2001; Langer,
1989b; LeBoeuf & Shaﬁr, 2003; Levin, Huneke, & Jas-
per, 2000; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Reger & Palmer,
1996). However, when the task used to investigate attri-
bute framing eﬀects contains little information other
than the framing manipulation, which is often the case
(for instance whether beef is 80% lean versus 20% fat),
more eﬀortful processing should lead to more framing
congruent cognitive associations and probably result in
greater framing eﬀects than less eﬀortful processing.
Furthermore, particularly within the aﬀect-cognition lit-
erature, there is growing consensus that processing con-
sequences of both negative and positive stimuli have
distinct advantages (e.g., Forgas, 2002b; Isen, 2002). Po-
sitive mood has for instance been found to promote
more ﬂexible and creative thinking styles (Forgas,
2002a; Isen, 2002). It is probably safe to conclude then,
that the impact of processing diﬀerences on evaluation,
judgment, choice and behavior depends on context, in
particular the nature of the task. This, in turn, makes
it very diﬃcult to explain how people think (i.e., cogni-
tive and aﬀective process) based on studies of what peo-
ple think (e.g., evaluation and decisions). Accordingly,
to better understand the processes that underlie framingeﬀects, we need more research that investigates process
and output separately.
This study has limitations that should be considered
when interpreting the results. First, this study used an
experimental design and, thus, suﬀers from the limita-
tions of generalization to more complex natural situa-
tions. Moreover, the use of a student sample further
limits the generalizability of the results. Second, to be
able to test potential eﬀects of framing on recall and con-
ﬁdence, we had to present the framing manipulation in
the beginning of the business scenario (before the factual
information used to measure recall and conﬁdence). This
may have resulted in weaker manipulation eﬀects than if
the manipulation information had been presented in the
last sentence, as is usually the case. Third, even though
participants were randomly assigned to the three groups,
we can not completely rule out the possibility that other
factors than framing may have inﬂuenced the results, for
instance individual diﬀerences in expectations and norms
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986) regarding the prior perfor-
mance information used to manipulate framing. Thus,
it is not impossible that the stronger framing eﬀect that
was obtained in the positive frame could be interpreted
as the deviation from some previously established norm.
The fact that we were stressing the potential successes of
the funding in favor of failures in this framing condition,
may thus by the audience have seemed like a ‘‘pitch’’
constructed to enhance the likelihood that more funding
would be forthcoming. Hence, the positive frame may
have been regarded by some as an attempt to persuade
rather than an invitation to evaluate the information.
This criticism is well in line with the views of constructiv-
ist theorists who argue that frames can be distorted by
communicators acting strategically to secure their own
instrumental interests.
Finally, our measures of recall, conﬁdence and self-
reported analytical thinking represent indirect opera-
tionalizations of cognitive processing. This limitation is
evident in the non-signiﬁcant diﬀerences for self-reported
analytical thinking, which may in part be explained by a
social desirability bias, leading participants to report
having thought more carefully about their decisions than
they actually did. It is also possible that it is diﬃcult for
people to give accurate descriptions of their level of
information processing (e.g., Svenson, 1989). We know,
for instance, that people often think of themselves as ac-
tive and purposeful decision makers, while research in
managerial cognition suggest that they may be predis-
posed toward using relatively eﬀortless information pro-
cessing most of the time (e.g., Louis & Sutton, 1991;
Mitchell & Beach, 1990; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Walsh,
1995). In support of these arguments, self-reported ana-
lytical thinking was not signiﬁcantly correlated with re-
call or conﬁdence. However, social desirability should
not be a problem for our incidental recall test and the
conﬁdence measure. Moreover, using the same instru-
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mann (2004) found that need for cognition was positively
related to recall and negatively related to conﬁdence.
Accordingly, these twomeasures should be adequate indi-
cators of cognitive processing, and clearly better than
speculating about cognitive processes on the bases of out-
put measures only (e.g., evaluation or decisions). Still,
alternative operationalizations of level of processing such
as response latencies (e.g., Svenson & Benson, 1993) or
verbal protocols (e.g., Maule, 1994) are needed before
any ﬁrm conclusion can be drawn.
Despite these limitations, the results of this study may
have one important practical implication. Many in the
popular press celebrate the beneﬁts of a positive outlook
(Dunegan, 1993) and strategic cognition researchers ar-
gue that the potential power of viewing environmental
events, trends and developments in a positive way is so
strong that organizations should actively construct
opportunities, and suppress threats (e.g., Dutton, 1993).
However, even though positive framing and opportunity
interpretation has the capacity to enhance motivation
and ﬂexible processing, and very high levels of threat per-
ceptions may result in ﬁxed or rigid processing (Staw,
Sandelands, &Dutton, 1981), negative framingmay have
the advantage of fostering more systematic processing.
Furthermore, managers are fare from immune to positive
illusions (Bazerman &Hoﬀman, 1999; Hayward &Ham-
brick, 1997; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Kuvaas, 2002)
and they often act as cognitive misers when making deci-
sions, even important ones (Beach & Mitchell, 1990).
Thus, managers may beneﬁt from knowing that both po-
sitive and negative framing have distinct advantages and
disadvantages. This line of reasoning also implies that an
interesting avenue for future research is to explore poten-
tial beneﬁts from purposely framing key information in
both positive and negative terms in ‘‘real world’’ deci-
sion-making or strategic conversations.
Framing research is only beginning to understand the
cognitive processes that underlie valence-based framing
(Ku¨hberger, 1997, 1998; Levin et al., 1998). The present
study was undertaken to increase our knowledge of
attribute framing eﬀects and obtained support for posi-
tive–negative information processing asymmetry using
both process (recall and conﬁdence) and output (evalu-
ation) indicators. Accordingly, even though Levin et
al.s (1998) typology of valence framing has made a very
important contribution to the framing literature by
organizing and explaining risky choice, goal, and attri-
bute framing, the explanation of attribute framing may
be further developed.Appendix. Story used to induce positive(negative) framing
Imagine you are the project manager of a student
organization at a university. The student organizationconsists of 14 diﬀerent project teams that are engaged
in planning and implementation of diﬀerent student pro-
jects. Of the projects undertaken by the largest project
team, ‘‘The Student Week,’’ seven of the last 10 have
been successful (three of the last ten have been unsuc-
cessful). The student organization is commercially run
and needs more proﬁtable than unproﬁtable projects.
The operations are organized by a management team
consisting of a marketing manager, a project coordina-
tor and yourself being the leader of the group. The bud-
get for 2000 is approximately 1 million NOK. The most
important source of income is membership fee from
around 1500 students. In addition, the student organiza-
tion has three main sponsors; Lillebrand Inc., Storeborg
Inc. and the Burseth Group.
In late March, the Student Week project team asks
you for 50,000 NOK more than originally budgeted in
order to ﬁnish a project called ODIN – a project that
should have been completed ﬁve weeks ago. ODIN
has been running for six months and has already been
funded with 200,000 NOK. Despite the delay, the pro-
ject group has great faith in the project. ODIN is a com-
bined social and educational arrangement. Those
responsible for the project are students with diﬀerent
levels of experience in arranging student projects. The
turnover of members is relatively high because students
that get their degrees leave the project and continuity is
provided by written project reports. The members of the
project are not paid, but are motivated by the ‘‘work
experience’’ and networking associated with working
in student projects.
For the coming year, you have 500,000 NOK at your
disposal for funding new projects and you have to use
this budget if you want to spend the additional 50,000
NOK on ODIN. If ODIN fails, you will also have to
provide coverage of deﬁcit.References
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